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The purpose of this book was to determine empirically – by examining 
the historical record – and with particular reference to the development 
of copyright law in Australia, the truth or non-truth of modern 
assumptions about the origins and function of copyright law. It is the 
first study of 20th century copyright law to set the claims made about 
the function of copyright regulation in the context of how the laws 
actually came to be passed.1 The book shows that copyright law in 
Britain and Australia was not made in the way claimed by proponents 
of copyright orthodoxy. Consequently, it undermines or overturns 
long-held assumptions about copyright regulation. 
Copyright laws in Australia were, through the 20th century and beyond, 
made to the design of self-interested individuals, not, as declared by 
copyright orthodoxy, governments seeking to stimulate the production 
and consumption of copyright material. Governments responded to 
political agitation by granting rights, and qualified those rights in the 
hope that the restrictions would prevent misuse leading to monopolies. 
In a legislative sense, governments operated primarily as amanuenses 
for private interests and it is in the motivations and actions of those 
private interests that the substance of the story of copyright lies. 
Perhaps the most interesting fact to be gleaned from the history of 20th 
century copyright law is that the great agitation for authors’ rights, led 
by the Berne Union, ultimately worked to the advantage of industries, 
not individuals. The authors, and the Union, aspired to absolute control 
over the production of copyright material, control that they believed to 
be their natural entitlement. But the demand for mechanical rights 
unleashed a revolution with consequences they did not foresee. By 
demanding a surfeit of rights, they provoked the phonographic industry 
into seeking analogous rights. 
                                                     
1 The research involved looking at Australian and British parliamentary records, 
government departmental records and reports (including the archives of the 
Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department and records of the Prime 
Minister’s office), and reports in, and correspondence to, British and Australian 
newspapers in the periods 1909–1912, 1925–1940, 1947–1956, 1958–1962, 1967–
1969, 1972–1980. 
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In a real sense, the modern copyright industries are the unwitting 
creation of the movement for authors’ rights. Had the Berne Union not 
asserted that the author must control mechanical reproduction, it is 
possible that the music and film industries, and later the broadcasting 
and software industries, would have been content to regulate their 
activities through contractual, rather than property, rights. Once the 
authors claimed the right to control mechanical reproduction – and 
dissemination – they confronted producers with the prospect of 
ruinous competition to secure rights to reproduce and disseminate.  
The producers pre-empted the creation of a system in which the 
mechanical rights were auctioned to the highest bidder by securing 
analogous rights (together with the privileges of compulsory licensing) 
in copyright legislation. 
The pattern for future developments in copyright regulation was then 
set: authors were to be granted the right to control each new method of 
reproducing or disseminating copyright material and analogous rights 
were simultaneously awarded to producers. The aggrandising 
movement for authors’ rights created the modern industrial system of 
copyright production. Copyright regulation arose from a contest to 
control the process of producing copyright material, and, almost 
literally, the Berne Union and the industries laid down the law: 
governments then made laws according to their direction. 
Along the way, legislators passed facilitating provisions to help 
collecting societies to secure – on behalf of copyright owners – 
payments in gross from the users of copyright material. Copyright 
legislation thus governed large-scale revenue transfers, a function never 
contemplated by the early legislators or even the proponents of 
authors’ rights. Between the world wars, Australia’s largest and oldest 
collecting society, APRA, drew its largest revenues from government – 
the A Class radio stations and then the ABC – which more willingly 
paid public performance fees. It then began to extract similar revenues 
from commercial radio stations.  
CAL, now almost APRA’s equal in size of collections, began collecting 
in the mid 1980s and continues to draw the overwhelming proportion 
of its revenue from the public sector – schools, universities and 
government departments. Assisted by the Copyright Tribunal, which 
determines rates of equitable remuneration, the collecting societies bear 
witness to the efficacy in copyright history of skilful, determined 
lobbying by private interest groups – the copyright legislation places 
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lopsided emphasis on facilitating their extraction of rents from 
copyright users, in particular, public or government users. 
The apotheosis of all these developments is the Age of America,  
which promises to subsume the local concerns of countries like 
Australia in the movement towards a worldwide copyright law friendly 
to the economic needs of the US copyright industries. The credo  
of US copyright imperialism is clear – it is spelt out in the  
TRIPS Agreement and, short of an unforeseen mental revolution, must 
soon dominate the world. And behind it lies the intelligence, foresight 
and energy of individuals, the successors in spirit (though the second 
group might disavow the first) of the men who created the authors’ 
rights movement, founded the Berne Union, and launched the modern 
age of copyright.  
The following policy observations are drawn from the research 
contained in this book.  
1. The Berne Convention precipitated the creation of 
modern copyright law 
The influence of the Berne Convention on the domestic copyright law 
of Britain and Australia cannot be over-estimated. The historical record 
shows that the Berne Union’s optimising approach to author’s rights 
lies at the root of developments in British and Australian copyright law 
in the 20th century. 
The assertion of optimal rights for authors forced the phonographic 
industry to seek, in self-defence, copyright protections that it might 
otherwise not have sought. The campaign for authors’ rights threatened 
the viability of the phonographic industry, and by asserting the 
legitimacy of a producers’ copyright, the industry encouraged like 
producers to campaign for copyright protection.2 
The record does not disclose why the Convention proved so influential 
in policy-making, but it does reveal that the need to accede to the 
Convention, and the concept of a uniform imperial copyright law, 
                                                     
2 The broadcasting industry – successfully – and sports promoters – unsuccessfully 
– later followed the lead of the phonographic industry and cited the organised 
expenditure of labour, investment and skill as criteria for the grant of copyright. 
The phonographic industry, specifically John Drummond Robertson, persuaded 
the legislature that originality was not a necessary criterion for the subsistence of 
copyright.  
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influenced British and Australian policy-makers more profoundly than 
any other idea. 
2. Early legislators tried to qualify the scope of 
copyright 
Despite the optimising strategy of the Berne Convention, many early 
legislators and policymakers were concerned to limit, so far as they 
deemed practicable, the potential for copyright law to create harmful 
monopolies. They were also hostile to the claims of copyright 
producers-publishers and the phonographic industry – but ultimately 
conceded rights to the latter to prevent the owners of works from 
licensing only one or two record companies to make recordings.  
Australia rejected the 50 year posthumous term in 1905 and politicians 
and members of the public criticised the term during the debates that 
preceded its adoption there in 1911. The British and Australian 
legislatures introduced compulsory licensing schemes for both books 
and records, effectively reducing the posthumous term for literary 
works to 25 years. 
Their attitudes to copyright regulation were informed by natural law 
conceptions of copyright as a just reward for the creators of  
works. Economic calculation seems to have played a secondary  
role in government thinking. Conceptual confusion resulted: the  
official outlook was hostile to the producer interest, yet sympathetic to 
the creation of authors’ rights that were fundamentally economic  
in content. 
While they sought to benefit authors in legislation, the British and 
Australian polities were forced to recognise that if they granted authors 
exclusive rights in relation to the fixation and dissemination of 
copyright works, they must perforce allow some analogous rights to the 
industries that made fixation and dissemination possible. 
But the logic they imputed to copyright regulation derived strictly from 
natural law. In Australia in 1905, legislators solved the problem by 
ignoring (consciously or not) the existence of the mechanical industries, 
but in 1911 and 1912 the accommodation made between natural law 
and utilitarian economics split modern copyright law, conceptually and 
practically, from its forerunner in the 19th century. 
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3. 20th century legislators paid little attention to 
questions of incentive or production 
Copyright orthodoxy holds that copyright laws were made to provide 
creators and industries with the incentive to produce and disseminate 
copyright material. In the 19th century, legislators sought principally to 
protect publishers against book piracy. In the 20th century, their 
successors paid little attention to questions of incentive, production or 
dissemination. Instead, they came to concentrate on satisfying a 
tripartite hierarchy of needs beginning with the necessity – declared in 
the Berne Convention – for authors to control the productive process, 
followed by the requirement that industries share, by analogous rights, 
in the rewards of production, and ending with the imperative for some 
legislative curbs on the power of the two primary pressure groups.  
In the early years of the 20th century, legislators accepted natural law 
justifications for authors’ rights. By 1911–12 these conceptions did  
not preclude them from recognising the economic dangers of 
concentrating rights exclusively in the hands of authors. However,  
the admixture of natural law assumptions and propositions advanced 
out of economic self-interest confused and compromised policy for the 
rest of the century.  
By a hybrid process, sometimes coherent, sometimes piecemeal, 
politicians created the modern law of authors’ and neighbouring rights, 
responding to the economic demands of competing factions. Those 
demands – often disguised in the language of natural law or justice – 
derived from calculations of economic self-interest unrelated to 
considerations of economic efficiency. The long posthumous term, the 
attempt to arrogate to authors monopoly control over the production 
process, the equal attempt of industries to exert maximum control over 
production and distribution – none of these features of law and  
law-making were designed to encourage production (already a certainty) 
or the dissemination (in the public interest) of copyright material at  
low prices.  
Import controls allowing producers to control the distribution of 
copyright material, restricting supply and maintaining high prices, 
testified to the fact that copyright legislators were indifferent to public 
welfare. The question of how to encourage optimum production and 
dissemination seemingly never crossed their minds as they legislated for 
the long posthumous term and entrenched distribution controls in law.  
 
428 
4. Copyright does not confer an automatic right of 
remuneration  
The putative principle that all uses of copyright subject matter are 
remunerable cannot be said to have been settled in policy or legislative 
debate. The historical record shows that when exclusive rights were 
first enacted early in the 20th century, legislators did not contemplate 
that copyright owners would demand fees for all copyright uses. When 
in the 1920s Australian copyright users disputed APRA’s right to levy 
performing right fees, the Government declared that the holder of the 
performing right could charge user fees. However, fees were 
recoverable under contract. Copyright law conferred only the positive 
right to authorise the public performance of music or the negative right 
to forbid performance. 
The 1911 British Copyright Act conferred explicit rights to 
remuneration in the provisions establishing the compulsory sound 
recording and publishing licences. The compulsory licence for  
sound recordings specified a rate of fees payable to the copyright 
owner for recordings made for a commercial purpose. The 25 year rule 
allowed for publication of a work 25 years after the author’s death 
subject to payment of a royalty. Compensation for economic loss 
supplied the self-evident rationale (also stated in debate) for the right  
to remuneration. 
Modern statutory schemes permitting compulsory copying by 
educational institutions and government were also justified on the 
grounds that they compensate the copyright owner for economic loss 
caused by educational or government copying. However, unlike the 
original compulsory licences, the statutory licences apply to mostly 
non-commercial copying carried out for educational or government 
purposes. When the Franki Committee recommended a statutory 
licence for educational copying in 1976, it could not point to 
identifiable economic losses caused to authors by photocopying. The 
Committee stated “substantial use” and “prejudice [to] sales” as the 
factors determining the requirement for remuneration. 
While the exclusive rights can be interpreted logically to confer a right 
of remuneration for use, policymakers and parliamentarians have not 
interrogated the logic of remuneration for use in debate. Writings, 
speeches and debates that attended the passing of legislation in 1911 
and 1912, and the subsequent history of copyright law-making in the 
20th century, do not support the proposition that non-commercial use 
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is automatically remunerable. Prior to enactment of the statutory 
licences, the Franki Report and the Australian Parliament argued a 
priori that owners were entitled to demand fees for educational and 
government copying. But substantive debate on the justification for 
taxing non-commercial uses of copyright material is absent from  
the record. 
Policymakers and legislators never reached consensus that all copyright 
uses should be remunerable. Since 1967, when the Berne Union 
enunciated criteria that permit exceptions to exclusive rights in national 
laws, the principle that use demands payment has received mostly 
implicit endorsement from copyright proponents and policymakers.3 
However, it is doubtful whether the principle is dialectically adducible 
from copyright rationales proclaimed, since the beginning of the 20th 
century, in policy documents and legislative debates. 
Questions about the nexus between the exclusive rights and 
remuneration cannot satisfactorily be settled a priori. They must lead to 
discussion of the purpose of the rights, a debate which necessarily 
involves consideration of legislative intent. 
The case of Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales4 suggests 
that in certain circumstances legislators do not consider that copyright 
confers an absolute entitlement to remuneration. In that case, the Full 
Federal Court found that the legal scheme for registering survey plans, 
established by statute, licensed government to reproduce and 
communicate the plans. 
The historical record suggests that, historically, policymakers and 
legislators did not intend that non-commercial uses should invariably, if 
at all, be remunerable. The tenor of legislative debates suggests that 
few, if any, politicians in 1911 or 1912 would have agreed that non-
commercial uses of material were remunerable. Nor is it clear that the 
early policymakers or legislators would have supported the expansive 
interpretations of owners’ rights that delivered the principle technical 
                                                     
3 The Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement and WIPO Copyright Agreement have 
established the “three step test” for determining whether legislative exceptions to 
exclusive rights are permissible.  The criteria contained in the last two “steps” refer 
to the “normal exploitation of the work” and “unreasonable prejudice to the 
legitimate interests of the author”.  Interpreted narrowly, these criteria confine 
statutory derogations from exclusive rights, and also suggest that the author is 
entitled to profit from most, if not all, copyright uses.   
4 [2007] FCAFC 80. 
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premise of the present statutory schemes – the idea that owners are 
entitled to discretely tax the copying of single pages of copyright works.   
5. Legislators did not try to “balance” the interests of 
owners and users 
The idea that copyright legislation creates a “balance” between the 
interests of copyright owners and copyright users, the fair dealing, 
library and educational provisions “balancing” the exclusive rights, is 
not supported by historical evidence. The Spicer Committee introduced 
the concept of a balance of interests to Australian policymakers in its 
1959 report and thereafter they adopted the view that copyright 
legislation is designed to balance the interests of owners and users.5 
The Spicer Committee enunciated a novel idea. Legislators in the 19th 
and early 20th century passed copyright laws first to defend authors 
(and publishers) against piracy and then to allow growing classes of 
owners to control the production, distribution and use of copyright 
material. Fair dealing provisions in the 1911 British Copyright Act, and 
the enumeration of copyright offences, established the copyright 
owner’s hegemony – exceptions to exclusive rights were to be seen as a 
concession to the “public interest”. Only a handful of lawmakers in the 
1911-12 copyright debates in Britain and Australia referred to the 
public interest.  
From the 1920s onwards, commercial wars over performing rights in 
Britain and Australia led to loud protests over the alleged misuse of 
exclusive rights. Politicians realised that the perceived abuse – or 
misallocation – of proprietary rights could alienate the public and 
pragmatically tried to introduce “balance” to legislation that recognised 
the dominion of copyright owners. Prior to 1911, legislators did not 
recognise this dominion and regarded copyright as a limited privilege 
that ought not to curtail the public’s freedom to enjoy art, literature and 
music. Legislation aimed to outlaw piracy, that is, unauthorised 
reproduction for a commercial purpose. 
 
                                                     
5 See second reading speech of Reginald Wright, Minister for Works, explaining the 
Copyright Bill in the Australian Parliament in 1968.  The Franki Committee’s terms 
of reference in 1974 included the requirement that the Committee recommend 
legislative or other changes “to effect a proper balance of interests” between 
owners and users. 
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6. Copyright legislation regulates taxation in gross of 
non-commercial (or non-competing) users to the 
detriment of public welfare  
The legislative settlements of 1911 and 1912 were made in favour of 
copyright owners. Collective rights administration, relying on the 
schema established in 1911-1912, has caused public welfare deficits. 
The exercise of the performing right by the PRS and APRA, and the 
assertion of a mechanical recording right by the record industry, caused 
commercial warfare in the 1920s and 1930s. Administering collective 
rights schemes, and charging performing right licence fees, the PRS and 
APRA supervised the transfer in gross of funds from copyright users  
to owners.  
Contemporary critics alleged that unequal bargaining power resulted in 
extortionate licence fees, and secrecy about distributions made 
impossible judgments about the efficiency and fairness of distributions. 
Similar criticisms were made over the last two decades and more in 
relation to statutory licence schemes for educational and government 
copying. Although the Copyright Tribunal is intended to create equity 
in commercial bargaining, critics allege that licence fees determined in 
the Tribunal have resulted in gross fees payments detrimental to  
public welfare.  
A substantial part of the modern copyright legislation is dedicated to 
facilitating collective rights administration by collecting societies. The 
educational and government copying provisions in legislation, especially 
educational provisions, establish at length schemes for collecting fees. 
However, the schemes have not defused the criticisms that were 
applied to the PRS and APRA in the 1930s: legislation vests in 
collecting societies too much economic power, the benefit of 
collections to individual copyright owners is unproven, the justification 
for collections is doubtful and the size of collections for non-
commercial copying diverts income from public interest activities 
(education and government administration). Additionally, the rationale 
for levying fees for non-commercial uses – that the exclusive rights 
comprehend the right to charge for any use – is open to challenge on 
historical and theoretical grounds.  
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Underlying these criticisms is the fundamental accusation: vested 
economic interest6 benefits from the statutory licences, and private 
taxation of sectors engaged in non-commercial activities (or that are not 
competing with copyright owners) creates economic inefficiency. 
Statutory licensing schemes facilitating revenue collection by collective 
rights administrators are justified by proponents on the basis that they 
represent the most efficient and equitable way of distributing licence 
fees to individual copyright owners. But proponents have never 
demonstrated (and refuse to demonstrate) that distributions reward 
individual owners in proportion to use made of their copyright 
material. The history of copyright regulation in the first half of the 20th 
century does not disclose intent on the part of policymakers or 
legislators to endorse taxation of non-commercial or non-competing 
uses of copyright subject matter. 
7. The structure of the Australian Copyright Act reflects 
sectional interest 
Substantial portions of the Australian Copyright Act are devoted to 
highly technical provisions dealing with the obligations of educational 
institutions under the educational statutory licence, the Copyright 
Tribunal and offences and remedies relating to infringement including 
by decryption and the use of circumvention devices. It could 
reasonably said that nearly half the Act, which, in less than 40 years 
burgeoned in length from a little over 100 pages to 678 pages, 
exhaustively establishes a system to protect revenue transfers. The 
economic efficiency of such a system is highly doubtful. The 
educational statutory licence is a primary example of an economically 
inefficient revenue device. Even assuming – an assumption 
unsupported by evidence – that the licence works to efficiently 
remunerate authors, devoting over 50 pages of legislation to procedures 
for extracting revenue betokens an unhealthy focus on rent-seeking.  
Why copyright legislation, and therefore Parliament, should sanction a 
standardised revenue-collection process that substitutes for economic 
bargaining between copyright owner and user is mysterious – unless 
explained, in public choice terms, by the operation of sectional interest. 
Intelligent lobbying explains why the statutory licences apply to the  
 
                                                     
6 In the 1930s the alleged vested interests impugned were musical publishers and 
record companies.  In the last two decades critics have identified publishers as 
CAL’s main constituency.  
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educational sector and government, and not the private sector. Private 
entities would reject out of hand the revenue demands made by 
collecting societies on schools, universities and government, then beat a 
path to the doors of politicians shouting for prohibition. But the 
system of State-endorsed revenue collecting by collecting societies, 
regulated under voluminous provisions of the Copyright Act, and 
sanctioned by the Copyright Tribunal, imposes considerable costs and 
limitations on copyright users, without demonstrably benefiting the 
majority of copyright authors. 
8. Public interest considerations were raised 
consistently in policy and legislative debates 
The aggrandising program of the Berne Union, and the claims of 
copyright industries seeking rights analogous to those granted authors, 
created a copyright law prejudiced against gratuitous public access to 
copyright material. Nevertheless, the public interest, while never a 
predominant concern of policy-makers or politicians, was raised in the 
1905 legislative debate, at the Imperial Copyright Conference, by the 
Sydney Morning Herald in 1911, the Rome Conference of the Berne 
Union in 1928, and in the British and Australian legislative debates of 
1911, 1912 and 1968. During the hearings of the Royal Commission of 
Performing Rights in 1932–33, Justice Owen and John Keating placed 
significant emphasis on the importance of considering the public 
interest in determining copyright policy.  
9. The pursuit of authors’ rights led to the creation of 
analogous producers’ rights 
By claiming for authors the right to control the production and 
performance of copyright material, the advocates of authors’ rights 
made certain the development of a movement towards neighbouring 
rights. The aggrandising activities of the Berne Union and its domestic 
proponents caused the phonographic industry in the United Kingdom 
to demand, in the 1911 Copyright Act, a compulsory licence and the 
protection of copyright. 
Affronted that the phonographic industry could record performances 
of works without authorisation – and made large profits from doing so 
– authors sought and received the right to control the recording of 
musical works. Facing the prospect of authors authorising a single 
entity or restricted group to make recordings of their works, thereby 
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excluding the larger group of producers, the phonographic industry 
took steps to ensure that monopoly or cartel could not arise. 
It did so by asserting that the record producer was entitled to copyright 
protection in the same degree as the author of a work, by seeking 
copyright in recordings, and agitating for the introduction of a 
compulsory licensing scheme. 
But for the campaign for authors’ rights, the phonographic industry 
would not have sought copyright protection. The industry established a 
precedent. Later, the radio and television industries saw that proprietary 
rights provided them with control over broadcasting. Again, the 
aggrandising of the Berne Union encouraged these industries to act 
defensively. The Berne Union demanded that domestic laws recognise 
the right of authors to control the broadcasting of works. The 
broadcasting industries saw the need to secure an analogous right to 
control the process of dissemination.  
The creative faction is thus the true author of the modern dispensation 
of copyright, in which the copyright industries enjoy rights analogous 
to those held by the owners of copyright in works.  
10. Copyright protection did not cause the economic 
success of the copyright industries 
For nearly two decades before the passing of the 1911 Copyright Act, 
the phonographic industry enjoyed immense commercial success from 
sales of gramophones and gramophone records. The industry profited 
from recording performances of works without consent of, or payment 
to, the owners of copyright in works, but it did not owe its success to 
the incentives supposedly supplied by copyright law. 
Similarly, the broadcasting and software industries functioned highly 
successfully for many years – the radio industry for nearly 40 years – 
prior to seeking, and receiving, copyright protection. Prior to the 
extension of copyright protection to those industries in the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s, regulators did not leap to the conclusion that 
copyright should extend to the producers and disseminators of 
copyright material. 
The Beveridge Committee inquiring into British television broadcasting 
declined to comment on the desirability of granting copyright to 
broadcasters, and the Gregory Committee proposed broadcasters’ 
copyright as the most convenient method of reconciling the competing 
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claims of broadcasters, sporting organisations and performers. 
Considerations of industrial regulation rather than incentives to 
production predominated in the analyses of both the Gregory and 
Spicer Committees. 
11. APRA’s revenue demands led to the creation of 
Article 11 bis(2) of the Berne Convention and the 
Australian Copyright Tribunal 
APRA’s campaign for public performance fees in the 1920s and 1930s 
precipitated a long battle with the commercial users of music. It had 
two specific consequences. In 1928, the Australian and New Zealand 
delegates to the Berne Union’s Rome Conference to amend the Berne 
Convention fought for agreement to qualify Article 11bis. Article 
11bis(1) conferred on authors the right to control broadcasts. Paragraph 
2, agreed thanks to the efforts of the antipodean delegates, permitted 
Union members to impose legislative conditions on the exercise of the 
right (provided they were not prejudicial to the moral rights of the 
author, nor the right to obtain equitable remuneration). This 
qualification followed the initial qualification of authors’ rights at the 
Berlin Conference in 1908 (which permitted legislative ‘reservations 
and conditions’ to be imposed on the grant of the mechanical 
reproduction right), and represented another step towards 
neighbouring rights.  
The second consequence of APRA’s search for revenue was the 
establishment of the Copyright Tribunal. After the Royal Commission 
on Performing Rights recommended the creation of a tribunal, 
Australian lawmakers questioned whether the Berne Convention and 
imperial legislation permitted them to qualify the operation of the 
performing right in this way. Doubts were resolved after the  
1956 British Act provided for a tribunal. The 1968 Australian Act 
followed suit. 
12. The record industry asserted the mechanical 
performing right opportunistically 
In Britain and Australia at the start of the 1930s record companies 
banned radio broadcasters from purchasing and playing their records. 
Radio stations relied on old stock or purchased records from foreign 
suppliers. The recording industry imposed the ban after a drastic fall in 
record sales at the end of the 1920s. Manufacturers feared that 
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broadcasters overplayed hit songs, discouraging listeners from 
purchasing their records. They hoped that the radio ban would send 
music listeners back into shops to buy the latest gramophone  
recordings. The radio bans naturally caused controversy in both 
countries and in Australia invited the attention of the Royal 
Commission on Performing Rights.  
In Australia, the record industry went further than in Britain where the 
ban applied to the government-funded national broadcaster. 
Arguments at the Royal Commission disclosed the depth of feeling of 
record companies against commercial radio stations. The radio ban in 
Australia aimed to destroy the commercial stations, leaving only the 
national broadcaster, the ABC, to play records. Faced with hostile 
publicity the record companies scrambled to explain the legal basis for 
their prohibition on record sales. After two decades of restricted 
copyright in recordings, they discovered a performing right in records. 
According to the record companies, the compulsory licence to make 
records comprehended a derivative right to control the performance of 
those records. Thus, they claimed, they could prevent radio stations 
from playing their records.  
The recording industry asserted the mechanical performing right 
opportunistically, to defend the legality of the radio ban, and then 
realised the future benefit of insisting on the right. A mechanical 
performing right, like the musical performing right, could be exercised 
to demand public performance fees. Fortunately for the industry, in 
1934 the English High Court in Gramophone Company Ltd v Stephen 
Cawardine and Co Ltd agreed that the compulsory licence also conferred 
a mechanical performance right. The British and Australian Copyright 
Acts of 1956 and 1968 recognised the right.  
13. The role of individual agency is underestimated in 
analysis of copyright 
Modern theorising about the purpose and function of copyright seems 
often to imply that copyright laws developed according to an  
innate process of logic. Regulation, according to this view, followed 
from the official realisation that in order to stimulate production  
and dissemination, governments must create property in works and  
their embodiments. 
In fact, policy-makers and legislators in the early part of the 20th 
century did not assert any like doctrine of copyright. They accepted the 
 
437 
resolutions of the Berne Union, without closely examining its 
reasoning, and sought to implement them because they believed in a 
vague notion, grounded in natural law principles, of an author’s 
entitlement to reward for labour. 
Copyright law was made to the often conflicting, and sometimes 
incoherent, plans of individuals. Writers, expressing a zealous belief in 
their vocational entitlements, created the Berne Convention. Politicians 
who accepted or shared that belief gave legal effect to the decrees of 
the Convention. In the process, individuals made copyright law 
according to their predilections. 
For example, the Australian Copyright Bill of 1905 proposed a 
posthumous copyright term of 30 years, but when the Bill was debated, 
the eloquence of Sir Josiah Symon ensured that the Australian term was 
42 years from publication or seven years from the death of the author, 
whichever period was the longer. Australian assent to the principle of a 
50 year posthumous term resulted principally from the actions of one 
man, Hallam Tennyson, who flouted official instructions when he 
supported the motion of the Imperial Copyright Conference in favour 
of the 50 year period. 
Individual action was also decisive also in securing the introduction of a 
statutory compulsory licensing scheme for musical recordings. John 
Drummond Robertson, the head of the Gramophone Company 
Limited, Britain’s largest record producers, set the template for 
successful lobbying by industry of government when he persuaded the 
legislature to introduce compulsory licensing provisions in the 
Copyright Act of 1911. His arguments failed to sway the Gorrell 
Committee two years earlier but his persistence and intellectual force 
proved decisive before the House of Commons. Thanks to Robertson, 
the 1911 Act provided for the compulsory licence, which allowed 
record companies to sidestep authors and control the recording 
process. Until his intervention, the record companies stood to receive 
no more than a limited copyright in their recordings, a largely worthless 
gift in the absence of a compulsory licensing scheme.  
In 1928, the determined efforts of William Harrison Moore and his 
New Zealand counterpart resulted in the Berne Union agreeing, at its 
Rome Conference, to allow members to place certain qualifications on 
the right of authors to control the broadcasting of works. By securing 
this proviso, they brought to international attention considerations of 
the public interest and hastened the movement towards neighbouring 
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rights. In 1934, Justice Frederick Maugham decided in Gramophone 
Company Ltd v Stephen Cawardine and Co Ltd that the compulsory licence 
encompassed a mechanical performing right. In so doing, Maugham 
ignored the seemingly irresistible counter-current of opinion which 
held that the copyright laws allowed only one performing right – the 
musical performing right. 
At the beginning of the 1950s, the Association for the Protection of 
Copyright in Sports, stewarded by Sir Arthur Elvin and Francis Gentle, 
and advised by the leading barrister Kew Edwin Shelley (counsel to the 
PRS), precipitated the formation of the Gregory Committee. The 
Association did not succeed in securing sporting copyright: the Gregory 
Committee rejected its claims for copyright in sporting events and 
recommended the creation of broadcaster copyright. However, it is 
possible that but for the Association’s agitation, the British 
Government would have delayed review of the copyright laws by 
several years. Additionally, the strength of its agitation forced the 
Gregory Committee to engage seriously with the question of sporting 
broadcasts and to clear the way for legislative recognition of 
neighbouring rights. 
In Australia in the 1970s, the firebrand advocacy of one man, Gustaf 
O’Donnell, also cleared a way – in this case for the creation of a 
collecting society, CAL, that now equals APRA in revenue takings and 
influence. Without O’Donnell’s energy and one track devotion to the 
cause of authors’ remuneration, it is unlikely that Australia would have 
legislated to create an educational statutory licence. The edifice of 
copyright revenue collecting in Australia is built on foundations laid by 
APRA in the 1920s and 1930s but O’Donnell’s proselytising made the 
supervening structure possible. 
The Age of America did not emerge unbidden from the white heat of 
creation and transformation that established the global economic 
ascendancy of the US copyright industries. In the 1980s, a handful of 
senior executives and lawyers devised and implemented a strategy to tie 
intellectual property rights to trade policy. As a result, the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative became a copyright zealot 
negotiating multilateral and bilateral arrangements that established 
stringent protection and enforcement norms across the world. 
Together, the US IP industries and the USTR have made the world 
safer and safer for American copyright commerce.  
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14. The commercial struggle for control over the 
broadcasting of sport precipitated the Gregory 
Committee inquiry 
From the late 1940s, sporting associations in the United Kingdom 
contested the right of the BBC to televise sporting events without the 
associations’ permission. To secure control over the broadcasting of 
events they demanded copyright in sporting spectacles on the basis that 
these spectacles amounted to public performances of sport. In 1950, 
the associations met to discuss a ban of all television broadcasting of 
sport and their pressure caused the Government to call a public inquiry 
into copyright law. After the Gregory Report in 1952 proposed that 
broadcast copyright vest in the BBC, the associations imposed a partial 
ban on the televising of sport. As a result of the disruption caused to 
sports broadcasting the Government a second, commercial, television 
broadcasting licence. The new Independent Television Authority (ITV) 
supplied some of the money demanded by the associations as a 
condition for permitting sports broadcasting.  
15. The origins of Australian copyright policy orthodoxy 
lie in the Spicer Report and the second reading in the 
Senate of the 1968 Copyright Bill 
The Spicer Committee introduced the idea that copyright regulation 
should aim to balance the interests of copyright owners and those of 
the users or consumers of copyright material. The Senate first 
articulated the theory that legislation must balance competing interests 
to preserve the incentive to produce, while promoting access to 
information, in 1968. 
16. The parallel importation provisions of the Australian 
Copyright Act were carried over from imperial legislation 
Import control formed part of British copyright legislation from the 
Statute of Anne in 1710. The importation provisions of the British 
Copyright Act of 1842 allowed the copyright owner to control the 
supply of overseas books into Britain, supposedly to deter foreign 
piracy. The 1842 Act was an imperial statute that applied to all British 
possessions, including the Australian colonies. In practice, it allowed  
British book publishers to control the supply of books into Australia, 
foreclosing from Australian distributors non-British sources of books, 
as well as British suppliers other than the publishers or their nominees. 
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The Australian Copyright Act of 1905 made no provision for import 
controls and instead made the importation of counterfeit goods an 
offence. In 1912, four Australian parliamentarians spoke passionately 
against the import control provisions in the 1912 Copyright Bill. In 
1968 another parliamentarian attacked the controls. The Government 
in 1912 made no reasoned defence of the importation controls – they 
seem to have been imported into the Copyright Bill reflexively, because 
of their provenance in British legislation. Utilised then by British 
publishers, and later by all the copyright industries, to enforce 
distribution monopolies in Australia, they were carried into Australian 
law as a matter of automatic deference, rather than for any reason of 
national interest or necessity. 
17. Australian legislative debate has seen two great 
statements of principle: the first over the posthumous 
term and the second over import controls. 
In the 1905 Senate debate on the Copyright Bill, Sir Josiah Symon 
expounded on Thomas Macaulay’s famous warnings against a lengthy 
posthumous term. He declared that “copyright is a monopoly, and like 
all monopolies, it is evil in essence.” This statement of copyright 
scepticism can be taken as the essence of the 1905 Parliament’s attitude 
to copyright law. Parliament accepted that regulation was necessary to 
secure economic justice for authors, but it would not endorse a 
conception of copyright that extended beyond granting to copyright 
creators control over the production of books and works of art. 
Parliament accepted Symon’s argument and rejected the posthumous 
copyright term of 30 years proposed in the Copyright Bill. It did so 
because it accepted that, in the words of Macaulay, the long 
posthumous term was “an impost on the public”, that, if enacted, 
would be “no nullity but a very serious and pernicious reality.” 
Committed to incorporating the British Copyright Act of 1911 into 
Australian legislation, the parliamentarians of 1912, for the most part, 
did not cavil at accepting a 50 year posthumous term. But twice in the 
years between 1905 and 1912, the Australian Government declared its 
commitment to the shorter copyright term in the 1905 Act.  
Twice, however, its London representative, Lord Tennyson, thwarted 
its wish to have the Imperial Copyright Conference apprised of  
that commitment. 
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The second statement of principle concerned the import monopoly. In 
1912, Senator John Keating began a debate on the topic, arguing 
fervently against the import controls in the Copyright Bill. His 
arguments, and those that followed, represented a profound assertion 
of the of the Australian interest against the impositions of foreign and 
private interests. 
Keating warned of “the dangers that will beset the people of Australia 
if the Bill goes through” and declared the import provision “‘a great big 
blackmailing clause”. His Lower House colleague David Gordon said, 
“we should legislate according to Australian requirements” and noted 
that “the Australian public ought to be protected to the extent of 
preventing any person here from having a monopoly and charging 
them just what he may choose”. William Archibald declared “an 
injustice will be done to people in Australia’ and ‘[w]e should not make 
away with our rights.” 
18. The content of the modern copyright law of Australia 
is the entire creation of international conventions and 
British precedents 
Australians wrote the Copyright Act of 1905 according to their 
precepts. The Act of 1912, however, incorporated the British Act of 
1911 into Australian law and the 1968 Act drew heavily on the British 
Act of 1956. The British statutes of 1911 and 1956 themselves resulted 
from the British Parliament implementing the prescripts of the Berlin 
Convention of 1908 and the Brussels Convention of 1948. The 
mechanical performing right written into both the British Act of 1956 
and the Australian Act of 1968 was first accepted in British common 
law in 1934. Broadcast rights were introduced in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Gregory Committee. 
To the extent that Australian copyright law follows the provisions of 
the Berne Convention – an example of a Convention prescript is the 50 
year posthumous term – the Australian Government cannot reverse the 
copyright law without offending international treaty obligations. But 
not all aspects of the copyright law are derived from treaty obligations. 
The most obvious example of legislative provisions that can be 
overturned without affecting any legal obligation of the 
Commonwealth is the import control provisions. 
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19. Doubts over term persisted at the official level until 
the 1950s 
The Brussels Convention made it mandatory for ratifying countries to 
legislate for a 50 year posthumous term for works. The Gregory 
Committee, however, declared that it was sympathetic to arguments  
in favour of a reduced term and recommended that the term for 
copyright in records and cinematograph films be 25 years from the  
date of production. 
 
